The Impact of Border Conflicts in Africa

*Elizabeth Kaluki Ngumbi (PhD).[*1], Francis Ebenezer Godwyll (PhD)[2] & Esameddin Alhadi (PhD)[3] [1]Catholic University of Eastern Africa, PO Box 62157, Nairobi, Kenya,*
[*]E-mail: elizangumbi@yahoo.com (corresponding e-mail)
[2]202 McCracken Hall, College of Education, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701, United States of America, E-mail: godwyll@ohio.edu
[3]346 Pugh Hall P.O. Box 115565 University of Florida Gainesville, FL 32611-5565
E-mail: ealhadi@aall.ufl.edu

Abstract

The borders in Africa separating the 53 countries are at best artificial and arbitrary. They resulted from the cumulative effect of colonization on the continent. In some cases, there are no physical barriers separating countries yet some border demarcations have served as sources of misunderstandings and conflicts. We contend that they are designed to function in a manner that keeps Africa fragmented and her countries engaged in continual hostilities. These hostilities are, in most cases, devastating, expensive, and they absorb the larger share of the already stretched economic resources. This article criticizes and rejects the dominating geopolitical vision that borders should be seen as the symbol of state sovereignty and should, therefore, remain sacred and unchangeable. This viewpoint should and must be reconsidered, given the fact that many borders should be seen as foreign and unwanted imposition and should function as tools for integration rather than separation.

Keywords: ***Borders conflicts,*** *African Unity, War, Poverty*

1. Introduction

This article looks at the effect of the African borders and their relation to the current state of underdevelopment and impoverishment in Africa. We maintain that these borders were designed mainly to fulfill specific economic ends for the benefit of the colonizing powers and have ultimately contributed to the current depressed economic situation in Africa. Almost all modern African states have retained the boundaries established by the colonial powers; a principle established by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and intended to stop Africa from fragmenting into ethnically based states (BBC, 2000, para. 9). In addition to serving their primary intended purposes, these borders, to this date, continue to function in a way that obstructs the prospects of economic growth and integration. This is one contributory factor of poverty in Africa where regional economic integration is lacking; and commercial activities are, to a major degree, still being conducted on country bases, with nearly complete isolation from other countries.

This is the age of big and efficient economic groupings, where borders between countries and even continents are dissolving, yet being better managed and viewed as tools of amalgamation rather than isolation. Such a vision needs to be developed in Africa. Many economic organizations have been set up at different times in different locations in Africa but in times of regional conflicts, wide political and social instability, and an increasing environment of mistrust and doubts undermine possibilities of creating a healthy atmosphere where these organizations can flourish, grow stronger, and become efficient. The outdated geopolitical factors and the concept of obsolete sovereignty surrounding the African border issues need to be reconsidered in the best interest and welfare of African countries. According to the WordNet Home page, the word geopolitics is a noun that connotes the influence economic geography on the state powers (Fellbaum, 1998). On the otherhand, geopolitics is referred to as relationships between one nation and the rest of the world, i.e. the level of influence a nation exercises over neighboring nations with respect to trade, economic aid, and military intervention (home.ica.net/~drw/glosse-g.htm). In relation to this article geopolitics of borders will refer to the unique advantages as well as challenges that the arbitrary demarcations that separate the countries of Africa pose to the different countries.

The article discusses the case of border conflicts in Africa and their role in wasting a huge proportion of the limited resources of the continent including land (Porteous, 2004; Brabyn, 1998). It begins with a historical overview of borders in Africa followed by an analysis of how the arbitrariness of the created borders in Africa contributes to conflicts. The socio-economic (effect) of conflicts on Africa is then broadly interrogated. We use the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict as a case to examine in more specific terms the human and economic cost on border conflicts and how it escalated poverty in the two countries. The question as to why African leaders still keep these borders in place despite their catastrophic effects is the next area of our focus. We then shift attention to begin to consider alternatives to the current situation and suggest some strategies for the way forward before we draw conclusions.

2. Historical Overview

The borders issue could be looked at from different viewpoints. This article tackles the economic aspect of borders and how they contribute to the state of impoverishment of the continent in the 20^{th} Century, and continue to do so in the present. Following the abolition of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, the desire to create a direct physical European presence in Africa intensified (Bond, 2002). The exploration activities continued with tireless efforts, and in the decade preceding the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, many exploration associations interested in Africa popped up all over Europe (Uzoigwe, 1981; Khapoya, 2009; Nineteenth Century History, 2009: Pakenham, 1992).

When the Europeans met at the Berlin conference, they already had a huge pile of information, maps, and knowledge about distribution and locations of Africa's mineral, human, agricultural, and animal resources (Pakenham, 1992). The role of explorers went far beyond the nature of their work. King Leopold of Belgium hired the explorer Henry Stanley to acquire territory in the rich Congo Basin. Between 1879 and 1880, Stanley gained the title to more than 900,000 square miles (more than 76 times the entire area of Belgium) by deceiving local chiefs who could not comprehend what they were signing while others had been converted to Christianity to ease the processes of deception (MacDonnell, 1970; Brabyn, 1998; Landau, 1995). This is similar to what was done by many others in the service of other colonial powers, such as Count DeBrazza for France in North Congo and Dr. Karl Peters for Germany in East Africa.

According to Davidson (2000, 2001) European explorers such as David Livingstone were out to make a name and profit in Africa in terms of resources. Different from their previous European compatriots who wanted slaves, they were interested in land, gold, and great and beautiful sceneries (Brabyn, 1998). Christopher (1983) explains how Africans lost land to European settlers because they were forced into confined settlement reserves by the colonial governments. These exploration efforts made the task of dividing Africa into regions and later into 53 states very easy. By late 1886, most of Africa was occupied by European military forces following the recommendations of explorers (Nineteenth Century History, 2009). The European Chartered Companies played the role of advisors to their governments and convinced them of the advantages and economic potentialities of each specific piece of land in Africa making a strong case for each foreign government to choose which area to conquer. For instance, the British and German governments divided between themselves the mainland territories of the Zanzibar following the advice of the Royal Charter of the British East India Company, which was granted the right to coin money, build forts, and even wage war (Cawston, 1968; Brabyn, 1998; Davidson, 2001). Much of Eastern African economic privileges were shared between the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (the German East Africa Company) and William McKinnon's private British East Africa Company (Galbraith, 1970).

Galbraith maintains that by 1888, the German East Africa Company had established a capital city of its own, north of what today is Dar es Salaam, and immediately introduced land ownership laws that ignited fear and skepticism. When this policy became more aggressive in confiscating lands and forcing people to sell theirs, opposition was organized but met immediately by force and eventually severely crushed. The role of these big European companies behind the colonization of Africa and their decisive say in defining the borders was very evident. The British South African Company in Southern Africa; the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria; the Deutche Kolonialgesellschaft fur Sud West Africa in Namibia; the North West Kamerun Gesellschaft in Cameroon; and the numerous French companies in the area of Congo, Gabon, and the Central African Republic all contributed to the consolidation of territorial claims made by the European companies (Prescott, 1987; Galbraith, 1970).

Similarly, the border between Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi was designed following a mutual agreement between Germany and Belgium; the border was then redesigned in 1910 when Britain interfered following the recommendation of its influential companies. The whole idea of designing the borders in this region was built on economic needs; this resulted in a policy that forced Belgium to encourage the initiative of "labor immigration" that included both the Tutsi and Hutu tribes, a situation that caused the chaos that predominates in the region to the present day (Gallaghy, 2001). All these incidents were based on the colonial powers' plans to make the best design of borders to secure as many of the benefits pertaining to the natural and mineral resources of the continent as possible, but without clashing with other colonizers. However, conflicts between the colonial powers were not always civil. Sometimes these conflicts generated wars such as the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) when the British government decided to expand its presence to areas that were originally assigned to the Dutch following the discoveries of gold and diamonds in the region and the subsequent advice of the British Charter Companies to their government to annex the area for these treasures (Cawston, 1968). Consequently, the border was adjusted and the same area remains a pocket of conflict in the Southern African region today.

This state of affairs made Africa extremely fragmented into smaller states where people had readily identified themselves by tribe, ideology, profession, religion, and economic class. As a direct result of this ethnic disintegration, groups such as the Hausas and Fulanis existed in British Nigeria, the former German/ Cameroon and later French/ British Cameroon, Niger and Chad. The Arabs of North Africa were scattered in French, Spanish and Italian colonies. The Mandingos were in French and British colonies, such as Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. There were the Fang in different French colonies in Equatorial Africa, the Mende in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Ewe in British Gold Coast (Ghana), French Togo and in French Benin (Humanitarian Information Unit of the State Department, 2009). These facts are indicative of the real intentions behind the African borders that were set by the colonial powers. In spite of these undeniable facts, there are still writers who defend the Europeans and the way they created the African borders. For example, Prescott (1987, p. 259) writes that:

The concept that the colonial powers were only motivated by national greed and drew boundaries without due regard for the structure of African social, cultural and political structures is wrong. In most cases the boundaries were drawn after obtaining the best information available, often from tribal leaders. Frequently, the boundaries were demarcated and adjustments were made during that process to create better functional boundaries. Often the boundary treaties included provisions to reduce the hardship faced by people living near the lines.

These statements are baseless, and in direct contradiction to the facts described above. If they consulted with tribal leaders, why would tribal leaders of the Ewes of Ghana agree to their tribe members being scattered across the three countries of Ghana, Togo and Benin when they speak the same language and have identical customs and rituals? Again, why would a Kenyan Somali leader share his people with Somalia? Another example of this fragmentation is given by Conrad and Conde (2004) who argue that the Mande people are found in Mali, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Senegambia (the region occupied by the republics of Senegal and Gambia), Northern Ivory Coast, Southern Mauritania, western Burkina Faso and northern Liberia where different dialects of the Mandinka language are spoken. Despite the numerous dialects of the language, the culture of the Mandinka people is basically the same across the region. We question, if strength lies in numbers, why would tribal leaders sacrifice their own political capital in this way only to be merged with different groups they have nothing in common? Davidson (1992) further buttresses this fragmentation of groups in Africa with the point that in 1990, approximately 87% of African borders were passed from colonial times and only one-sixth of the colonial borders took into account ethnic configurations (Foucher, 1991). Christopher (1983) and Landau (1995) opine that various schemes of manipulation, bribery, concessions and even conversion of tribal leaders to Christianity among other schemes were adopted by many European powers to achieve their goal of colonial exploitation over land and social-cultural values easier.

3. Arbitrary Borders Causing Conflicts

African borders were arbitrarily established by exogenous colonial powers who had "…little knowledge of the local communities, thus, dividing preexisting and homogeneous ethnic groups and consequently stirring up frustrations and conflicts" (Loisel, 2004, p. 4). This view is supported by the report of The Humanitarian Information Unit of the United States State Department which indicated that 21 countries out of 53, almost 40% of the countries of Africa were involved in conflicts with an intricate web of inter relations and huge human, social and economic cost just between January and July of 2009 (http://hiu.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction =public.display&shortcut=JF4R).

Despite this overwhelming evidence of carnage, destruction and wastage, some scholars and outside powers deny the fact that the colonial borders have anything to do with the conflicts on the African soil (Harbeson, 2007; Hawkins, 2008). For instance, an interesting argument is raised by Gilkes and Plaut (2000) that "despite claims to the contrary, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been fighting not over a border but over rival hegemonic claims in the Horn of Africa and over "national pride" and "territorial integrity" (2000, p. 1). Although Herbst (2000) restates the same viewpoint, this argument is a mere play of words. What constitutes "national pride" and "territorial integrity?" The word "national" can be explained as the characteristics of a people of a given place and "pride" means a happy satisfied feeling or a high sense of a person's self-worth. When one applies these two concepts to a nation, "national pride" could elucidate a happy satisfied feeling of a people portrayed through their high sense of worthiness as a people.

Generally, people belong to a geographical space that they identify as their territory or terrain of influence. This space gives them their sense of belonging or their "weeness" with defined characteristics that they honor and cherish. So to fight to defend these highly honored characteristics or way of being within a defined geographical space a person belongs could be seen as defending ones territorial integrity and national pride. How different is this concept from the borders? The borders demarcate a geographical area people live who develop characteristics they cherish and honor and see as unique to them. Therefore, they will fight to maintain their way of life as well as the resources that underpin their life styles. We do not see how fighting for national pride and territorial integrity do not encompass issues about the borders. Hence, is it not disturbing that the main motivation and objectives for setting up the borders in Africa had little consideration for what Africans wanted? Why do Africans seem to relish these demarcations and are willing to even go to war to protect them?

We are tempted to conclude that the high rate of conflicts between nations (40% of the countries being at war in a span of seven months within one year) as stated earlier is highly linked to the existence of arbitrary borders on the continent of Africa. Shar (2000) explains how Africa in general has faced untold anguish from false borders established by the imperial and colonial rulers. Such divisions are quite similar to Imperial British policy of "divide and conquer" popularly used by almost all global power brokers throughout history.

4. Effect of Conflicts

Because of space limitations, this section cannot trace all the historical and political details related to African border conflicts, but rather will draw on their socio-economic effect and consequences in evaluating the level of impoverishment and loss of resources. Border disputes in Africa have a history full of sufferings, mistrust, and mismanagement. Since the early years of their independence, African countries broke into military confrontations to resolve unsettled border disagreements. The list is very long, and the story repeats itself. There are many unsettled disputes, and it has become a normal practice that the differing parties resort to military means to settle their disputes.

African countries have spent too many of their resources fighting each other. The result is more suffering for the already impoverished citizens and an extra burden on the already beleaguered economies. Although we will focus on the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war as a case study, it is important to point out other inter border conflicts. Different levels of border disputes in Africa occurred, including those between Mali and Burkina Faso, Morocco and Algeria, Ghana and Togo, Tanzania and Uganda, Niger and Benin, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Morocco and the Western Sahara, Libya and Chad, Mauritania and Senegal, Kenya and Somali, Sudan and Egypt, Rwanda and Burundi, Namibia and Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, Nigeria and Cameroon, Congo and Zambia as well as Malawi and Tanzania (United Nations, 2003). If we look into the details of these wars, and the huge amounts of wasted resources in human, financial, and environmental during these wars, we will have a very clear picture of the causes of social chaos and contributory causes of poverty in Africa.

Other examples of countries sharing borders in Africa and experiencing some skirmishes are Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR). Debos who reported on men with arms in Chad, lamented about the "…neglected regional crisis in Darfur, Chad, and the CAR" (2008, p. 35). The trans-border crisis has been in existence for many years but is hardly documented so that the rest of the world can gain a full view of the crisis. Debos describes how war lords are taking advantage of unemployed Chadian soldiers by recruiting them to fight with François Boziz´e in CAR and why many of them joined other armed groups after Boziz´e's takeover. What goes unreported, but as observed by Human Rights Watch (2007), is the freelance military entrepreneurship of regional warriors taking place across the borders as long as there is someone else across the border who may need their services. This freelance military entrepreneurship of regional warriors trade oscillates between Darfur (Sudan), Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR). The issue at stake is that if anybody wishes to quell the crises in many parts of Africa, such dangerous border activities and the circulation of armed men have to be abolished. However, also at play here is inadequate attention from the media and the rest of the world.

Further, the most frustrating aspect, as reported by Debos (2008) is that the international community treats the crisis as a mere spillover of the conflict in western Sudan, thus giving it very little attention, if any. Yet the magnitude of the problem cannot be overstated because the "situation in the region has been deteriorating for the past few years and is compounded by the destabilizing effects of the Darfur conflict" (Debos, 2008: 226).

5. The Case of Ethiopia and Eritrea Conflict

Negash and Trovoll (2000) mention that the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea broke into armed confrontations in May 1998 and caused wide economic instability in the border area. Each of the two fighting countries claimed ownership of the disputed 160 square miles of mountainous border territory. With the eruption of this conflict, both countries have diverted much of their already scarce resources to fund a war, as well as security-related activities rather than investing in development of its people. Another negative economic effect of this dispute is the end of the once thriving cross-border trade between the two countries. The two countries had 25 protocol agreements in different fields of cooperation, with special emphasis on economic activities (Negash & Trovoll, 2000; Patman, 1990).

According to a 2001 BBC report, as of early 1998 some 67 percent of Eritrea's external trade was conducted with Ethiopia. The BBC report adds that Eritrea required 600,000 to 1,000,000 metric tons of cereal grains. In a good year, it was able to meet nearly a quarter of its food needs; imports from Ethiopia filled much of the rest of the deficit. As the border war continued, Ethiopian properties at the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab, with a "…value of $133.3m, were looted" (Bhalla, 2001: para. 3).

Tens of thousands of Eritrean citizens who were employed at these facilities lost their source of income. Since Ethiopia no longer had a border along the Red Sea because of the conflict with Eritrea, it had to reroute its imports and exports activities to other countries' ports, such as Djibouti (BBC, 2001). With this action, it deprived Eritrea of one of its main sources of foreign revenue, and on the other side, "…increased the cost of transport and port handling to about $28.7m" (BBC, 2001: para. 2). This added significantly to the already soaring prices of imported and exported commodities. The export activities declined sharply because of the increase of transportation fees. Both warring parties accused each other of expelling thousands of peasants from the region and confiscated their lands for military purposes (Gilkes & Plaut, 2000). Consequently, "…those farmers and their families lost their properties including livestock, stored grains, production tools, and household utensils and were left to face poverty" (Bhalla, 2001: para. 10). To make matters worse, Ethiopia experienced a severe drought where some parts of the country lacked rain for more than two to three years, resulting in a major famine (Bhalla, 2001; BBC, 2001; Shar, 2000; Gilkes & Plaut, 2000). Despite all the starvation and poverty, the Ethiopian government still continued to spend large sums of money on the military at the expense of its citizens. Based on the above BBC report, it is important to note that both Eritrean and Ethiopian nationals shoulder a huge burden from this conflict, accelerated by natural catastrophes as indicated (Bhalla, 2001).

Reporting on the financial costs related to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict would be the best way to show how the African border system is functioning in the opposite direction. The "Independent Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute reports that the two and a half years of the border war cost Ethiopia more than \$2.9bn in terms of direct military expenses" (BBC, 2001: para 2). The government imposed a tax increase of 10% on some imported commodities to cover the budget deficit (BBC, 2001: para 8). The military spending in Ethiopia was 3.2% and 3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997 and 1998 respectively but in 1999 it increased to 12% of GDP. According to the BBC economic report, military expenditure also included the funds to cover the high increase of army personnel.

The BBC report gives more details about each party's efforts to resort to extra budgetary measures. Ethiopia diverted the proceeds of the privatization of state companies while reducing the share of other types of economic and development activities, such as road construction and repair. To further fund the war, Eritrea worked hard to raise about \$400 million from donations from its citizens abroad in addition to revenues from increased taxes and treasury bonds. The 2001 BBC report concludes: The high growth rate in the military expenditure has led to an increase in budgetary deficit; an increase in domestic borrowing; an increased gap of balance of payment; constraint in foreign exchange allocation for import; and a reduction in spending in other sectors.

The human cost includes nearly half a million citizens on both sides, who lived in the conflict region, who were killed, injured, or displaced from their living areas. The tragedies included suffering caused by large expulsions by both sides of their citizens, some of whom may have never lived in their mother country yet were forced to leave. Many people lost successful businesses because of either confiscation or abandonment and deportation (Negash & Trovoll, 2000; Gilkes & Plaut, 2000; Shar, 2000; Gilkes & Plaut, 2000).

Moreover, in the social arena, some vital social services were totally destroyed or only partly functioned. These included the following: health, water supply, education, electricity, livestock health facilities, and the infrastructure. Commercial enterprises, including factories, hotel industry, flour mills, and poultry farms, faced heavy destruction and damage. Roads, rails and bridges were shattered during the war as were other areas as a result of excessive movement of heavy military machinery to serve the war front (Bhalla, 2001).

The foreign investment activities in Ethiopia dropped during the war period to 81.2%, and only 47 out of the 217 foreign investment projects in the region were still operable after the war ended. Many other investors adopted a wait-and-see policy, delaying economic ventures. The tourist trade was badly affected by the eruption of the clashes. Thus, Ethiopia's foreign exchange earnings and income for hotel owners, air transport, travel agents, and tour operators were reduced greatly following the almost total halt of tourism activities.

Before the war, the international community and the government of Ethiopia worked toward a common goal of poverty reduction. However, when the conflict reached its climax, the international development aid was extensively frozen. Consequently, the annual average donation to the country lessened from $700m to only $50m (BBC, 2001, para, 20; Gilkes & Plaut, 2000).

6. Escalation of Poverty

These are just some of the main costs of the border conflict between two of the most impoverished countries on the continent (BBC, 2001). The core argument of this article is that these border disputes are reversing the goals of development, wasting huge resources on military buildup, and eventually helping poverty to escalate. Using this case of Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict to elucidate the point, some specific consequences linked to creation and promotion of poverty will be examined here. Ethiopia for example had experienced stable economic growth through economic reforms since the early 1990s, and GDP annual growth rate increased to 5.3% in 1997. In 1995, 31% of the total population was poor by international poverty guideline of 1US dollar a day per person (SESRTCIC, 2007). Level of poverty was directly affected by many natural and human-generated factors including the war and, accordingly, it rose to 53% by 2002. The increase of poverty level in Ethiopia was seen through the increasing infant mortality rate, which ranked the highest among 187 countries according to UNICEF estimates in 1999 (SESRTCIC, 2007). However, the 2007 figures confirm that these rates have declined by more than 20% (UNICEF, 2007). Children's malnutrition is widespread: 47% of children are underweight, and 51% of children are diminutive. Only 24% of the total population has access to safe water and only 15% has access to sanitation facilities. The rural population comprises 85% of the population, and poverty is more widespread in rural areas, with 38.7% living under the poverty line in 2009 (CIA fact-book, 2009). Thirty-three percent of the urban population falls below the poverty line.

In Eritrea, the statistics have not been well kept. However, it is beyond any doubt that the border conflict with Yemen in the mid-1990s, and later the border dispute with Ethiopia, have had an unmistakable negative effect on the level of poverty at both national and individual levels. In 1993-97, Eritrea ranked 148 according to the Human Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). In 2005, Eritrea jumped to 161, while Ethiopia ranked 170 after ranking 158 in 1997 (UNDP, 2005; IMF, 2005). The level of poverty in the country was 53% in 1993-94, but more recent studies conducted by the World Food Program (WFP) show that two-thirds of the 3.5 million people of Eritrea live below the poverty line. The reason behind this sharp increase among others is the rising numbers of displaced and refugee people after the war, along with the high rate of unemployment following the wide destruction of businesses and job cuts caused by budget adjustments to fulfill military requirements.

In September 2007, a meeting was held at The Hague with representatives from Ethiopia and Eritrea and brokered by a UN appointed border panel. It failed to yield any agreement on resolving the disputed common boundary. Leaders from both countries continue to accuse each other over a failure to settle their nine-year-old border dispute. Because arbitration has failed, there is a definite need to seek an alternative option to resolve this and many other African countries' border disputes.

Many plans for combating poverty in Africa are sometimes seriously hindered by border conflicts. Africa's regional cooperative development is severely threatened by these conflicts, and the more the economy remains closed and isolated, the more exposed to poverty the nation will be. Armed conflicts have become one of the major causes of poverty in Africa, leading to displacement of people, the destruction of communities' livelihoods, and denial of access to land and other resources (Porteous, 2004; DFID, 2001; Brabyn, 1998).

Geopolitical events of the past decade have shifted both trade and labor opportunities in the region. Border closures, refugee displacement and repatriation, and armed conflict have significantly affected regular supply and demand flows (IMF 2005). The current political state of affairs has limited the free flow of goods and labor between countries. For example, the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea closed when the two countries began fighting in 1998 (**Hammond, 2003;** Bhalla, 2001**).** Predictably, what resulted was a war fought on three fronts at the cost of tens of thousands of lives (BBC, 2000).

Security is the most advantageous climate for domestic savings and internal or external investment. The positive outcomes of security are not limited to the concerned countries but go far beyond to the surrounding region. This is also the case in war where the negative consequences of armed conflict cross deeper into the whole region. Military expenditure represents the best scale to measure the effect of these regional conflicts. The World Bank estimates that conflicts in Africa are causing a loss of 12% annual economic growth across the continent out of which border conflicts claim the greatest share (IMF & World Bank, 2001; DFID, 2001). Among the 13 countries that are currently classified as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) worldwide, 9 of them are in Africa; and because of conflicts, they are all classified as "not progressing towards qualifying for debt relief" (DFID, 2001: 12). They include: Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan.

Border conflicts in Africa have also created a substantial loss of investment opportunities because of the inability of states to invest in their own populations or because of high military spending that has squeezed out effective investment in the economy and wasted huge financial resources that could have otherwise been spent on education, health, and other welfare services (Porteous, 2004; DFID, 2001). The continent as a whole is seen as high risk by potential external investors because of the many armed conflicts (IMF & World Bank, 2001). This level of instability affects the climate for investment.

Many examples of economically linked border conflicts currently brewing on the continent exist, which are propelled by the fact that the interested parties fight for economic gains either at the macro or micro-levels. *Waititu and Barasa* (2009), reporting on the brewing conflict between Kenya and Uganda, expressed concern that *if sanity does not prevail, Kenya and Uganda could clash over the small Lake Victoria island of Migingo, setting the stage for more resource-related conflicts in Africa.* Fueled by a mixture of global warming, environmental ruin, and increasing droughts and famine, conflicts over resources are pushing Africa to the cliff (Porteous, 2004). The grounds for the conflict have already been set by Uganda replacing its soldiers with its police who are collecting Shs1.4m ($750) a year in taxes from Kenyan fishermen to allow them access to the fish resources. On the other hand, Kenya's members of parliament from the region have called on the Kenyan government to deploy the country's navy in the area and set up a naval base on the lake to "deal with external aggression" *(Waititu & Barasa*, 2009: 3). The major bone of contention is the ownership of this resource where the two parties are claiming ownership and rejecting negotiations. The two countries that are currently facing acute drought and food shortage are caught in a contest over resources. Yet poverty and need for job opportunities result as direct consequences of these geo-political factors. Thus, countries find it difficult to share resources since they rely on these dwindling resources for survival. A cycle is set into motion—I do not have enough therefore I will not share— because I do not want to share others are forced to lay claim to them— a conflict arises out of the impasse, which further shrinks the resources— making both parties dig their heels in the sand sometimes taking intractable positions.

In addition, Lake Victoria seems to be an area that could become a source of serious crisis involving many more countries, in addition to Kenya and Uganda. According to Waititu (2008), a dam construction by Yoweri Museveni, president of Uganda, on the Bujagali falls on the Nile is threatening the decline of fish stock in Lake Victoria since it reduces the flow of water into the lake, which is a resource shared by Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. According to Pottinger (2000: para 3 & 9):

The dam would be built 8 miles below two other large dams, the existing Owen Falls Dam and the Owen Falls Extension Project. [It will therefore be the] third dam on one short stretch of the river… [Further] the Ugandan government has plans to build up to six more dams on the Nile [to enable it export hydroelectricity]…. The area around Bujagali Falls supports a substantial number of subsistence and commercial fisherman, who depend on the resource for both food and income. The project will also drown Bujagali Falls, a national treasure. The "Source of the Nile" corridor is one of the most spectacular river stretches in the world.

Thus, not only will the dams affect the immediate environment but threaten the levels of the volume of water in the lake. According to Mugirya (2009), the two existing dams have already contributed to the fall in the volume of the lake to unprecedented levels in the last decades. The Ugandan government has proposed the building of a third and up to six dams on the course of the river. The question therefore is if two dams have had such dramatic consequences what will be effect of building more dams? The river Nile is also a source of livelihood for more people in Sudan and Egypt because of their dependence on the Nile River. Thus, of the different countries sharing the same resources, each has a legitimate claim because of their geo-political positions; yet having different interests, needs and ideas about how to use a common resource results in confusion and potential conflict. For example, *Waititu (2009)* explained that Uganda has been experiencing power shortages and the construction of a new Bujagali dam to produce more hydroelectric power is an attempt to solve the problem. However, this move is causing problems to Kenyan and Tanzanian fishermen who depend on the same resource for their livelihoods. The drop in water levels has changed the livelihood of fishermen drastically, and they are calling on governments to find a long-term solution, so as to avert the crisis. Thus, the "cloud thickens" over the possible consequences of the actions of Uganda with its border nations.

These borders can be anything but good. "Good" borders on the other hand, should be those that adapt to favor development and prevent conflicts. The question remains: If the existing borders are causing many crises, why are they still in place? Why are African leaders still "happy" with their existence? Who are they serving if they are a continuing source of conflict and death to millions of people?

7. African Leaders' Love Affair with Borders

Scholars give several reasons as to why African leaders seem to be silent despite the plight the continent seems to be facing in connection with the borders that were not put in place by Africans themselves. Shah (2009), drawing from Hawkins (2008), seems to agree that the background of conflicts in Africa are deeply rooted from the colonial era and post-World War II history. Colonialism and World War II are linked to the West and although some African leaders could have the political will to dismantle these demarcations, the powerful West could be retaining them directly or indirectly. Additionally, wars across African borders have social and political contexts, harboring huge complexities as to how to resolve them. Shah (2009) argues that these deadly borders are 'retained and controlled' internationally by influential nations with direct and indirect influences around the world. Again, the fluid identities of people today where one person can be from Africa but has an American or Canadian citizenship makes citizenship confinements delicate and undesirable at times (Woodard, 2001). Loisel (2004) argues that in addition, the conflicts have been further aggravated after independence by the politicization of ethnicity and the creation of national identities, whereby most patterns of conflict are now simultaneously polarized over ethnic boundaries and national borders.

McHugh (2001) also ventures an opinion on the reasons why borders are causing great property and human loss to Africa but are still kept intact. He attributes it to globalization, making the world a global village. This means that “things happening far away have an impact on [Africa]” (McHugh, 2001: 54). The debt crisis in Africa, unfair economic trade, balance of payment issues, internal conflicts within states, poverty, HIV/AIDS pandemic, drought, famine, economic decline leading to overdependence on foreign loans and economic aid have preoccupied individual states that their immediate attention in focused on day to day survival rather than larger issues such as the borders. This is reinforced by Bunting (1999) arguing that unfair trade coupled with globalization have placed so many trade barriers on African states that negatively affect their economies. Bunting continues to state that globalized trade by multinational companies is another factor that keeps these borders in place. For instance, Shah (2009) gives examples of how foreign multinational corporations are in-charge of extracting resources such as diamonds in Congo, oil in Nigeria and other parts of Africa. These agreements signed between individual countries and these corporations are difficult to renegotiate and the foreign partners will be less inclined to encourage a new integration of borders that could place them at a disadvantage.

One may ask what are the architects of these borders and by extension these devastating conflicts doing? The European/colonial powers, many of whom are united now under the umbrella of The European Union (EU), have been involved in much conflict resolution beyond its borders with much success. However, according to Loisel (2004), it is worrying to note that the EU's contribution to conflict settlements in most overseas conflicts, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, has been limited to election monitoring and small aid packages earmarked for conflict prevention programs. This means that less attention and resources are dedicated to external conflicts and conflicts on its immediate border. The major reason may be that sub-Saharan Africa does not belong to the EU. The main question is why do organizations such as the EU fail to do much in Africa despite the dreadful complexity of African conflicts and their complicity as de facto architects? Further, Loisel (2004) believes the failure to act to prevent conflict on the continent may rest more with the EU's perception and radicalization of ethnic differences whereby different communities see themselves differently rather than as one.

8. Isolation or Partnership?

African countries strive to keep themselves isolated and confined to their "national" borders. This geopolitical concept is now far outdated and not working practically. The idea of securing state sovereignty today may be challenged by internal factors, such as ethnic, tribal, religious, or class-based divisions. External factors are not only the neighboring countries but also the remote ones. Examples of other countries outside Africa will be used in terms of whom they are utilizing their borders as the context to suggest some ways forward. The cases of Serbia and Iraq support this argument (O'Leary, 2001).

While we witness border disputes break out constantly in Africa, other countries that are partitioned from each other by sea or other natural means are doing their best to break through these barriers and get in direct contact. One example is that of Britain and France, which, in spite of their political, cultural, and economic competition, are now connected through the Channel tunnel. Another example is the $4 billion, 10-mile long tunnel and bridge project across the Oresund Strait, connecting Denmark and Sweden for the first time since the last ice age. This project was completed and opened in the summer of 2001. This latest example of border demolition, according to C. W. Matthiessen, of the University of Copenhagen's Institute of Geography, was primarily intended to "create a regional economy that can compete with the large metropolitan areas of Europe" (Woodard 2001: para 4). Besides the economical advantages of this project, the 11 universities and colleges in the area have decided to come together to create a bigger regional academic confederation. By sharing resources, the institutions are establishing specialized programs that would otherwise have been eliminated. This academic confederation has formed a research alliance with the region's 26 hospitals and 150 biomedical companies, hoping they can dominate biomedicine field at the international level the way California's Silicon Valley dominated software in early 2000. The Britain/France border breakthrough has also proven to be a useful tool for promoting and attracting investment from all over the world to sites in both countries.

In essence, Woodard (2001) explains how European countries are joined through the European Union and other smaller organizations commonly known as “regionalization.” Such unionized blocks are serving as important pillars of trade and in forming policies that favor member countries. The fact that the European Union is attracting new membership: Sweden, Denmark, Turkey and others is a strong pointer to the significance of these organizations as trade partners. Consequently, the union is working on integrated metropolis across the shared frontier, shared working privileges, language, power grids, and cooperatively owned regional airlines and hotels. On the contrary, it is a pity that African countries are busy trying their best to keep their divisions including being unable to support African Union and other regional bodies through boarder and language differences.

These are just few examples of countries who believed that keeping confined to historical borders is meaningless. In Africa, there are no natural barriers that prevent contacts between countries and people. Artificial obstacles and obsolete legislations are the only constraints. In the Nile Basin Region, for instance, no natural barriers exist between the nine countries of the region. They all share the Nile River, which is the longest river in the world. From its major source, Lake Victoria in East Africa, the river flows north across 5,584 km (3,470 miles) to the Egyptian coast of the Mediterranean Sea. The river basin has an area of more than 3,349,000 sq km (1,293,049 sq. miles) (Shahin, 2002). This region is home for more than 150 million individuals and has vast agricultural, animal, fishery, cultural and historical, and power resources. Other mineral and oil discoveries are being reported regularly in different parts of the region. The region has direct access to three large and important international bodies of waters--the Mediterranean in the north, the Indian Ocean in the east, and the Red Sea in the northeast. A region with such unparalleled variety and quantities of resources and no natural barriers among its nine states is suffering badly from regional disputes. Besides the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, Sudan and Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda and Congo, Rwanda and Burundi have all suffered the catastrophes of border disputes, which are mostly unsettled. The level of poverty in these countries is escalating, and, as in other cases, they have diverted their resources to finance military activities on the border (Kerisel, 2001; Shahin, 2002).

Countries of East African, West African, the North African, and the South African regions have too much in common to be partitioned. It is necessary to encourage and expand the cross-border initiatives of the countries of these regions and to promote their regional integration and cooperation. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 1994, with 20 countries as members, to encourage economic integration among the countries in the region. Other groupings, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), are working in the same direction (Meyns, 1984). On easing border restrictions, these organizations aim at achieving complete free trade and a custom union that involves trading goods between countries without any customs duties and tariffs, the application of a common external tariff on imports from third countries and the application of common trade policies. Besides conducting dialogues with other multinational groupings for the purpose of promoting trade and economic cooperation, these organizations are expected to expand their efforts into diverse areas, such as water issues, migration, and drug and weapon smuggling (Porteous, 2004; Ngwenya, 2009).

Another one of these organizations is The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), formed in 1986 by Kenya and Uganda. IGAD as a cooperative organization made up of the countries on the Horn of Africa and is primarily responsible for combating drought and crop failures. Currently, the cooperative efforts have been broadened to include conflict prevention and management (IGAD, 2009). In West Africa, there are several cooperative organizations, such as the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), which was launched in 1975 and is currently the largest regional grouping with about 16 member nations. Its objective is to create a joint market based on border exchange integration. Nevertheless, its activities have been hampered by internal political instabilities in many of the member states and by many regional conflicts (Ezenwe, 1983).

9. Strategies for the Way Forward

Downes (2004) argues that although conventional wisdom by scholars and policy makers are not happy with drawing new borders as a conflict resolution mechanism, it could be a better option with the ability to stop war. Conflict resolution, which allows communal ownership and common understanding, is always diminished by constant fights which soak the worrying parties with a deep sense of mistrust. For instance, Trend News (2009: para 5) revealed the following:

> Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey have been broken due to Armenia's claims of an alleged genocide, and its occupation of Azerbaijani lands. The border between them has been broken since 1993… Turkish government [representatives] claimed that opening of the Turkish-Armenian border cannot be a topic of discussion, until Armenia withdrew its troops from the occupied Azerbaijani

lands.

The deep mistrust and failure to meet set conditions erases any chances of sharing power and other resources that could even be the cause of conflict, resulting in failed attempts and renewed warfare. For that reason, more demarcations that are based on mutual agreement could be considered as a long lasting solution to end ugly scenes of war, loss of human lives and property. If more collaboratively developed borders are established in Africa, they may reduce the existing wars by half.

According to Woods (2000), conflict resolution mechanisms are not easily bought by elites and other interested parties who fatten their pockets by fuelling the state of limbo and confusion in many countries in Africa. Therefore, calling the enemies to a negotiated settlement and moving towards political democracy is not easy. However, it is a mark of maturity and a major step in understanding, owning and wanting to do rid the country of conflict. Woods (2000) argues that it is through some delicate methods of convincing even in the shadow of war that South Africa and El Salvador are able to breathe a sigh of relief. This same convincing should take place in many parts of Africa where elites and politicians are tightly joining hands with the West to keep the fire of war burning at the expense of the unsuspecting and poor Africans.

10. Conclusion

It is clear that African borders are not helping the security issues of their countries. As a matter of fact, they are a major threat to the countries' security and stability, and there is a pressing need to see them managed differently. Border areas in Africa could function to facilitate regional economic integration and could therefore improve the social and economic stability of the people and regions and countries at large. Africa has suffered for too long from border disputes that have become the most threatening obstacles to any chance of unity and prosperity. The assumption that current armed conflict issues in some African states are because of artificial borders is beyond doubt. The disputes have so far generated a wide state of mistrust and loss of orientation, and they contribute largely to the high military expenditure in Africa, expenditure that could have otherwise been directed toward the needed social services. Africa needs to look at border issues with a vision that excludes the outdated geopolitical conception about state sovereignty. Given the number of border disputes among African countries since independence, and the high expenses of these wars, this article concludes that these borders have become major contributory factors to poverty and wastage in Africa.

References

BBC. (2000). *Border: A geographer's nightmare*. Retrieved May 2, 2007 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/07/99/battle_in_the_horn/396571.stm

BBC Web Site. (2001). War 'devastated' Ethiopian economy. Retrieved Sept 20, 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1476618.stm

Bhalla, N. (2001). War 'devastated' Ethiopian economy. Retrieved February 12, 2010 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1476618.stm

Bond, P. (2002). Fanon's warning: *A civil society reader on the new partnership for Africa's development.* Imprint Trenton, N. J: African World Press.

Brabyn, T. (1998). Coming next in darkest Africa: Miniatures articles and information. Foundry darkest Africa series. Retrieved December 13, 2009 from http://home.earthlink.net/ ~cyberkiwi/soldiers/articles.html

Bunting, I. (1999). Interview with Julius Nyerere. The heart of Africa. *New International Magazine, Issue 309, January-February.*

Cahnman, W. J. (1943). Concept of geopolitics. *American Sociological Review, 8(1), 55-59.*

Cawston, G. (1968). *The early chartered companies.* New York: Burt Franklin.

Christopher, A. (1983). *Colonial Africa*. London: Croom Helm.

Davidson, B. (2001). *Africa: A voyage of discovery with Basil Davidson*. A video series on the history of Africa. Retrieved December 15, 2009 from http://dickinsg.intrasun.tcnj.edu/films/basil/index.htm

Davidson, B. (2000). Basil Davidson African series. University of California. Retrieved December 15, 2009 from http://www.isop.ucla.edu/jscasc/resource/bdfilms.htm

Davidson, B. (1998). *West Africa before the colonial era: A history to 1850 (4th ed.)*. London: Longman.

Davidson, B. (1992). *The Blackman's Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*, London: James Curry.

Debos, M. (2008). Fluid loyalties in a regional crisis: Chadian "Ex- liberators" in the Central African Republic. *African Affairs, 107*(427), 225-241.

Department for International Development, Foreign &Commonwealth Office, The British Ministry of Defense. (2001). The *causes of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London.

Downes, A. B. (2004). *More borders, less conflict?* Partition as a solution to ethnic civil wars. *SAIS Review, 26(1), 49-61.*

DFID (2001). *The Causes of Conflict in Africa*, London: Department for International Development (Consultation Document).

Ezenwe, U. (1983). *ECOWAS and the economic integration of West Africa.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Fellbaum, C. (1998). *WordNet: An Electronic Lexical Database.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Foucher, M. (1991). *Fronts et frontières. Un tour du monde géopolitique*. Paris: Fayard.

Galbraith, J. S. (1970). "Italy, the British East Africa Company, and the Benadir Coast, 1888-1893." *The Journal of Modern History, 42(4), 549-563.*

Gallaghy, T. M. (2001). *From reshaping to resizing a failing state: The case of the Congo/Zaire.* In B. O'leary et al. *ight-sizing the state: The politics of moving borders* (pp. 102-127). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Gberie, L. (2005). West Africa: *The curse of Borders*. Znet. Retrieved May 6, 2007, from http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID =7060

Gilkes, P. & Plaut, M. (2000). The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. *Foreign Policy -In Focus,5(25),1-4.*

Hammond, L. (2003). *Obstacles to regional trade in the Horn of Africa: Borders, markets, and production*. Retrieved May 08, 2007, from http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/Pnacs368.pdf

Harbeson, J. (2007). East Africa: There's more than a border in. The Nation – Nairobi. Retrieved December 21, 2009 from http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/184-ethiopia/34010.pdf

Hawkins, V. (2008). Stealth conflicts: How the world's worst conflict is ignored. Retrieved December 8, 2009 from http://stealthconflicts.wordpress.com/2008/12/30/new-world-maps/

Herbst, J. (2000). *States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Human Rights Watch (2007). State of anarchy: Rebellion and abuses against civilians. *Human Rights Watch report, 19, 14 (a).*

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). (2009).Communique of the 33rd Ordinary session of IGAD council of ministers held from 7-8th December in Djibouti. Retrieved December 10, 2009 from http://www.igad.org/images/stories/files/33rd_COM/

Council_Communique_General_FINAL.pdf

IMF (2005). Ethiopia: Scaling up. Assessing the impact of a dramatic increase in aid on one of Africa's poorest countries. *Finance & Development:A Quarterly Magazine of IMF, 42, 3.*

IMF and World Bank (2001). *'Assistance to Post-Conflict Countries and the HIPC Framework',* Washington DC. Retrieved December 8, 2009 from (http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/- 2001/pc/042001.pdf)

Kerisel, J. (2001). *The Nile and its masters: Past, present, future:Source of hope and anger.* Balkema Publishers Vermont.

Khapoya, V. B. (2009). The African experience: An introduction (3rd ed). Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Landau, P. S. (1995). *The realm of the word: Language, gender and christianity in a Southern African kingdom.* London: James Currey.

Loisel, S. (2004). The European Union and African border conflicts: Assessing the impact of development cooperation. Working articles series no. 8 in EU border conflicts studies. UACES Student Forum Regional Conference, Cambridge, May 7th 2004. MacDonnell, J. (1970). *King Leopold II: His rule in Belgium and the Congo.* New York: Negro University Press.

McHugh, H. S. (2001). USAID and Ethnic Conflict: An Epiphany? In Esman, M. J. & Herring, R. J. (Eds.). *Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict; Rethinking Development Assistance*. East Lansing,MI: University of Michigan Press.

Mugirya, W. P. (2009). *A dam that activists simply can't make peace with.* IPS News Agency.Retrieved December 08, 2009. from http://www.eccplatform.org/index.php?option= com-content&task=view&id=1105&emid=207

Meyns, P. (1984). The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and regional cooperation in Southern Africa. In D. Mazzeo (Ed.), *African Regional Organizations* (pp. 2001-220). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Negash, T., & Trovoll, K. (2000). *Brothers at war: Making sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian war.* Oxford, England: James Curry.

Ngwenya, S. (2009). Speech of the Secretary General, COMESA at the second African Agriculture markets programme policy seminar. June 15-16, David Livingstone, Zambia.

Nineteenth Century History. (2009). Exploration of Africa: Henry Morton Stanley, journalist and explorer of Africa. Retrieved December 11, 2009 from http://history1800s.about.com/od/explorationofafrica/- Exploration_of_Africa.htm

O'Leary, B. (2001). Introduction. In B. O'leary et al. (Eds.), *Right- sizing the state: The politics of moving borders.* (pp. 1-14). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Pakenham, T. (1992). The scramble for Africa: White man's conquest of the dark continent from 1876-1912 (1st ed.). New York: Avon Books.

Patman, R. G. (1990). *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: Robert G. Patman.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Porteous, T. (2004). Resolving African conflict Crimes of war project: War in Africa. Retrieved December 9, 2009 from http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_01_porteos.html

Pottinger, L. (2000). Uganda's Bujagali Dam: A Case Study in Corporate Welfare. International Rivers Network Retrieved December 08, 2009 http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/ifccaseuganda.html

PR Newswire NY. (2007). *Child deaths fall below 10 million for first time.* Retrieved September 13, 2007, from www.unicefusa.org

Prescott, J. R. V. (1987). *Political frontiers and boundaries.* London: Allen & Unwin.
Shah, A. (2009). Conflicts in Africa: Introduction. Retrieved December 8, 2009 from //www.globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-africa-introduction

Shar, A. (2000). Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Global Issues: Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues that affect us all. Retrieved December 8, 2009 from http://www.globalissues.org/article/89/conflict- between-ethiopia-and-eritrea

Shahin, M. A. (2002). *Hydrology and water resources of Africa*. New York: Springer Publishers.

Statistics and Information Related to Poverty and Development in Both Countries. (2004). Retrieved February 26, 2004,from http://www.un.org/depts/ocha/cap/eritrea.html

Trend News (2009). Without solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, opening Turley-Armenia borders cannot be a topic of discussion: Turkish MP. Retrieved December 28, 2009 from http://en.trend.az/regions/met/turkey/1563829.html

United Nations (2003). Africa: Conflicts without borders: Sub-national and transitional conflict-affectedareas. Retrieved December 21, 2009 from http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/KKEE-6DMRTJ/$file/glossary.pdf?openelement

United Nations. (2005). Consolidated Appeal for Eritrea 2005. Retrieved Oct. 20, 2009 from http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1275

United Nations Development Program (2005). *Human Development Report 2005*. Retrieved September 12, 2007, from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/presskit/HDR05_PKE_HDI.pdf

UNICEF. (2007). Progress and challenges in Africa. Young child survival and development: In a child survival milestone, under-five deaths fall below 10 million per year. New York. Retrieved on November 12, 2009 from

Uzoigwe, G. N. (1981). European partition and conquest of Africa: An overview. In A. Adu Boahen (Ed.), *General history of Africa VII: African under colonial domination, 1880-1935* (pp. 19-44). London: Heinemann Educational Books.

*Waititu, E. (*2008). Museveni's dams a threat to Lake Victoria. Retrieved March 31st 2009, from http://afrikanews.org/index.php

Waititu, E. & Barasa, V. (2009). A Kenya-Uganda clash over Victoria fish could be a “model” conflict for the African continent. Retrieved on March 31st 2009, from http://afrikanews.org/index.ph

WFP (2009). WFP Calls for rescue package for the World's hungry http://one.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=3016

Woodard, C. (2001). New borders for the old world. Retrieved Sept. 12, 2009 http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0816/p11s1-wogi.html

Woods, E. J. (2000). *Forging democracy from below: Insurgent transitions in South Africa and El Salvador*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.